The Braess Paradox (BP) in traffic and communication networks is a powerful illustration of the possible counterintuitive implications of the Nash equilibrium solution. It shows that, paradoxically, when one or more links are added to a weighted network with linear costs that depend on congestion with an attempt to improve it, and each user independently seeks her best possible route, then the equilibrium cost of travel of all users may increase. Extending previous research by Rapoport et al. (2005), we report the results of a new experiment with a richer topology and asymmetric link costs of travel designed to assess the descriptive power of the BP.
Abstract
The Braess Paradox (BP) in traffic and communication networks is a powerful illustration of the possible counterintuitive implications of the Nash equilibrium solution. It shows that, paradoxically, when one or more links are added to a weighted network with linear costs that depend on congestion with an attempt to improve it, and each user independently seeks her best possible route, then the equilibrium cost of travel of all users may increase. Extending previous research by Rapoport et al. (2005) , we report the results of a new experiment with a richer topology and asymmetric link costs of travel designed to assess the descriptive power of the BP.
Our results show that with experience in traversing the network players' choice frequencies approach the equilibrium solution as implied by the BP.
Introduction
It is well known by now that Nash equilibrium-the principal solution concept for noncooperative n-person games-does not, in general, maximize social welfare. The two bestknown examples in the social sciences that most dramatically illustrate the Pareto deficiency of the Nash equilibrium, and that consequently have attracted considerable theoretical and experimental attention, are the finitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Centipede games. Both are finite games with complete information. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game each player has a dominant strategy. Simultaneous choice of the n dominant strategies yields a unique Pareto deficient equilibrium in pure strategies. When the game is iterated a finite and commonly known number of times, backward induction is invoked to yield mutual defection at each round of play.
For certain choices of parameter values, this result seems highly counterintuitive.
A second example is the Centipede game (Aumann, 1992 (Aumann, , 1995 (Aumann, , 1998 Rosenthal, 1981; and many others) . Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma game, which is a simultaneous-move game, in the Centipede game the n players move sequentially in a fixed order. The game has a finite and commonly known number of stages ("moves") and a binary strategy space, the same for each player: {"continue", "exit"}. It terminates on the first exit decision. In the two-player version of the game with J moves and exponentially increasing payoffs, payoffs are structured in such a way that 1) a player who exits on stage j, j=1, … , J, earns more than the other player, 2) payoffs associated with stage j+1 are obtained by multiplying each of the two payoffs on stage j by the same constant and reversing the player order, 3) both players are better off if the game continues for at least two more stages, and 4) if one of the players continues on stage j and the other exits on stages j+1, then the former is worse off and the latter is better off (see, e.g., Rapoport, 2003, for a non-technical presentation of the game). Figure 1 displays a two-person six-move game taken from Aumann (1992) . The equilibrium solution constructed by backward induction is for each player to exit on each stage. This results in the first player exiting on stage 1. Most reasonable people are not willing to accept this solution, or at least believe that it represents an approach of no practical value. Aumann considers the game to be one of the most "disturbing counterintuitive examples of rational interactive decision-making" (1992, p. 219).
--Insert Fig. 1 about hereThe Braess Paradox, which is the focus of the present study, is yet another powerful illustration of the possible counterintuitive implications of the Nash equilibrium concept. In a seminal and frequently cited paper, Braess (1968) proposed a very simple model of a congested network and showed that, paradoxically, when a new link is added to the network and each user independently seeks her best possible route from a common origin to a common destination, then for certain combinations of link costs and number of users, the equilibrium cost of travel of all users increases. This situation, subsequently dubbed the Braess Paradox (hereafter BP), has attracted considerable attention and instigated much theoretical research in transportation science, computer science, and other disciplines that are interested in interactive decision making in multi-agent decentralized systems. Researchers from these disciplines have attempted to classify networks in which the addition of one or more links could degrade network performance (Frank, 1981; Steinberg & Zangwill, 1983) , discover new paradoxes (Cohen & Kelly, 1990; Dafermos & Nagurney, 1984; Fisk, 1979; Pas & Principio, 1997) , and quantify the degree of degradation in network performance due to unregulated "selfish" behavior (Roughgarden & Tardos, 2002; Awerbuch, Azar, & Epstein, 2004 ). An excellent discussion of the BP, examples of its variants and attempts to design networks that do not suffer from its adverse effects appear in a recent research monograph by Roughgarden (2005) .
The finitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games, Centipede games, and network games susceptible to the BP provide three very different perspectives for examining noncooperative decision situations in which Nash equilibria, in general, do not maximize social welfare. The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is a normal form game that is repeated in time with no change in the payoff matrix. The Centipede game is a one-shot extensive form game with payoffs that change from one move to another. The BP is a concatenation of two network games. It is the counterintuitive and surprising implications of these games that deepen our understanding of the Nash equilibrium concept, clarify the inherent conflict between individual and group rationality, and force our intuition about distributed multi-agent decision making to evolve. A critical element in this on-going process is the experimental investigation of interactive decision making in these classes of games that complements and frequently instigates additional theoretical research. In the last 50 years or so since the publication of the book Games and Decisions by Luce and Raiffa (1957) , variants of the finitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game have been studied in literally thousands of experiments (see, e.g., Colman, 1995 , for a partial literature review). Perhaps because it was introduced and studied much later, experimental studies of the Centipede game have only appeared in the last 13 years (Bornstein, Kugler & Ziegelmeyer, 2004; Fey, McKelvey, & Palfrey, 1996; McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992; Nagel & Tang, 1998; Rapoport et al., 2003) . We are familiar with only a single experimental study of the BP by Rapoport et al. (2005, hereafter RKDG) that, in contrast to the results of the two-person Prisoner's Dilemma and Centipede experiments, has provided strong support to the equilibrium solution. The purpose of the present study is to extend the study of RKDG to topologically richer networks with asymmetric cost structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces terminology and illustrates the BP in a very simple traffic network with only two routes from a common origin to a common destination and linear cost functions. Section 3 summarizes the findings of two experiments conducted by RKDG. Although the two networks in their two experiments vary considerably from each other in their topology, both include cost functions that give rise to equilibrium solutions in which players divide themselves in equal numbers across routes (e.g., one half of the players selecting one route and the other half selecting the other route). Equal division of the set of players across routes, besides being atypical, provides a focal point that may considerably facilitate coordination in route selection. Therefore, Section 4 reports the design and results of another experiment, the third in the sequence, with a more complex network in which subsets of network users of different size are predicted to choose different routes in equilibrium. The results are summarized and discussed in Section 5.
The Braess Paradox: Terminology and Examples
Terminology. It is customary (e.g., Holzman & Law-yone, 2003) to model a two-terminal network by a graph G= (V,E,O,D) , where V is a finite set of vertices (nodes), E is a finite set of edges (arcs, links), and O (the origin) and D (the destination) are two distinct vertices in V. Each edge e∈E has a tail t(e)∈V and a head h(e)∈V; we interpret e as a one-way road segment from t(e) to h(e). A route (path) in the network G is a sequence of the form
where v 0 , v 1 , …,v g are distinct vertices, v 0 =O, v g =D, and e 1 , e 2 , …,e g are edges satisfying t(e i )=v i-1 and h(e i )=v i for i=1, 2, …, g.
We consider noncooperative games that are associated with the network G and have the following ingredients:
• A finite set of players (users) N={1, 2, …, n}. Transportation science differentiates between the case where n is infinite, so that each user has an infinitely small impact on road congestion, and the case where n is finite. Because our interest is in experimental testing of the BP, in our study n is relatively small and commonly known.
• An assignment of costs to edges depending on the number of users who traverse these edges. We denote by c ij (f ij ) the cost to each user of moving along an edge (i,j) with a tail t(e)=i and head h(e)=j, if the total number of users of (i,j) is f ij . In the context of traffic networks, c ij (f ij ) is taken to represent the travel time for road segment (i,j) when it is chosen by f ij users. For example, Arnott and Small (1994) estimated that the annual cost of driving delays in the US due to congestion was $640 per driver in 1994. It is probably much higher now.
In our game, every user has to get from the origin O to the destination D. Thus, the strategy space of each user is the set of routes in G. Any form of collusion between users is prohibited. If the n users choose travel routes so that a unilateral change of route by any one user does not lower her travel cost, given that all other n-1 users do not change their routes, then the n route choices are said to be in equilibrium. Similarly to RKDG, we consider in this paper traffic networks with linear costs, where for each edge (i,j)∈E, c ij =a ij f ij +b ij for some non-negative constants a ij and b ij . The linear cost function includes two components, a fixed component b ij that is interpreted as the time to traverse edge (i,j) by a single user, and a variable component a ij that accounts for the increase in cost due to of congestion. Linear edge costs were chosen both by RKDG and the present study because they are intuitive and thus most easily explained to the subjects, and because they are supported by empirical evidence (Steinberg & Zangwill, 1983) .
Examples. To illustrate the BP one needs two networks, a basic network and an augmented network. The augmented network includes the basic network and one or more traversal edges (crossroads, bridges). Figure 2a displays a very simple network with four vertices denoted by the letters O, A, B, and D, four edges, and an anti-symmetric (Penchina, 1997) arrangement of the edge costs: c OA =10f OA , c BD =10f BD , c AD =c OB =25. A major feature of our experiment is that the total travel cost is subtracted from a fixed endowment, denoted by r, which assumes the same value for each of the n players in both the basic and augmented networks. Figure 2b Fig. 2b , then the bridge will never be crossed.
There is a flip side to the BP that we find equally surprising. In the BP just described above, the addition of a cost-free link to a network causes every user to be worse off in equilibrium.
Alternatively, start with the augmented network in Fig. 2b , delete the cost-free edge (A,B) and note that, in equilibrium, all users benefit from the degradation of the network. One of the main purposes of Experiment 1 of RKDG was to determine whether these two alternative "framings" of the paradox in terms of losses or gains result in different patterns of behavior. We report the effect of the two alternative formulations on route choice in Section 3.
The occurrence of the BP in traffic networks critically depends on the choice of parameter values, namely, c ij (f ij ) and n. To further illustrate this dependence, assume the same costs as above but change n from 2 to 4. In the resulting basic Game 1A, equilibrium play dictates that 
Two Previous Experiments
A claim may be made that the BP is no more than a theoretical curiosity, that its effect, if any, will diminish with experience in traversing the same network, and that examples closer to the complexity of real life would prevent those kinds of paradoxes from being realized. After discussing the BP and two other related traffic paradoxes, Arnott and Small raised the same question: "Are these paradoxes more that intellectual curiosities?" (1994, p. 451) . With the exception of some anecdotal evidence reviewed in RKDG, no solid empirical evidence has been brought up in more than 35 years to answer this question. Consequently, RKDG pursued an alternative, experimental approach that simulates traffic networks susceptible to the BP in a computer-controlled laboratory, has financially motivated subjects who are paid contingent on their performance, independently and repeatedly choose routes in these networks both before and then after one or more edges are added to them, and then tests the equilibrium predictions underlying the BP on the aggregate and individual levels. RKDG reported the results of two different experiments, Experiments 1 and 2 that studied topologically different networks. As the findings of these experiments are very relevant to the present study, we present them in some The experimental design included the following main features: 1. The experiment was self-paced and computer-controlled.
2. Payoff was contingent on performance.
3. The group size n was commonly known, decisions were made independently, and reputation building was not possible.
4. The same subjects experienced one network for 40 rounds and then the second network for 40 more rounds.
5. Travel costs on each round were subtracted from a fixed endowment, r, which assumed the same value in the basic and augmented games. RKDG set r=400, so that under equilibrium play individual payoffs for the basic and augmented game were 100 and 40, respectively (a 2.5:1 payoff ratio).
The major findings can be summarized as follows:
1. There were no statistical differences in mean route choices between Conditions ADD and DELETE, nor any differences among the three sessions in each condition. Thus, route choice and rate of learning were immune to alternative framings of the BP in terms of adding a cost-free edge to the basic network (and, consequently, sustaining a 60 percent drop in earnings) or deleting the same cost-free edge from the augmented network (and, consequently, sustaining a 2.5 fold increase in earnings).
2. The equilibrium solutions (both pure and mixed) accounted very well for the mean route choices in Game 1A, and the mixed-strategy equilibrium accounted for the variability around the means. Fluctuations of the route frequencies around the mean in Game 1A persisted over the 40 rounds. There was no support for equilibrium play on the individual level, as most subjects mixed their route choices but not in the proportions implied by equilibrium play.
3. In strong support for the BP, mean route choices in Game 1B (and the corresponding individual payoffs) converged over iterations to the equilibrium strategies. By round 40, all 18 players in Game 1B were choosing the equilibrium deficient equilibrium strategy 
Experiment 2
In order to extend the investigation, Experiment 2 studied a topologically richer network. Three groups of 18 subjects each participated in Experiment 2. All the groups first played Game 2A for 80 rounds and then Game 2B for 80 more rounds (Condition ADD only). The endowment for each round-the same in both games-was set at r=196. This resulted in equilibrium payoffs of 64 and 32 in Games 2A and 2B, respectively, a 2:1 payoff ratio. The experimental findings can be summarized as follows:
1. There were no significant differences among the three groups.
2. Similarly to Experiment 1, the equilibrium solution accounted quite well for the mean route choices in the basic game. However, fluctuations around the mean persisted over the 80 rounds, and there was no support for equilibrium play on the individual level.
3. Route choice frequencies in the augmented game moved slowly with experience in the direction of the equilibrium solution, thereby supporting the BP. Although the number of rounds was doubled from 40 in Experiment 1 to 80 in Experiment 2, mean route choices of the two equilibrium routes did not converge to equilibrium by the end of the session.
Only 77.7 percent of the subjects were choosing one of the two equilibrium routes on round 80.
This last finding suggests that the effects of the BP may be restricted to simple networks. Our purpose here is not to demonstrate the descriptive power of the BP; this has already been established in Experiment 1. Rather, our purpose is to determine the scope of applicability of the BP by systematically investigating the effects of the topological structure of the network, cost functions, and group size. As the number of routes in a road network increases, travelers may no longer cope successfully with the information they receive about route choices by all members of the population and may, consequently, revert to simple heuristics for choosing their best routes.
Common to both experiments are anti-symmetric arrangements of edge costs resulting in equal proportions of players choosing routes in both the basic and augmented networks. Because this arrangement may serve as a strong coordination cue, we hypothesize that support for the BP will decline as this cost arrangement is changed.
A New Network Experiment with Asymmetric Costs
The Networks and Their Equilibria c OC (7)+c CA (7)+c AD (7)=60+0+84=144<c OA (1)+c AD (7)=76+84=160.
Unilateral deviation from route (O-C-A-D) to route (O-C-E-D) does not pay off:
c OC (7)+c CA (7)+c AD (7)=60+0+84=144<c OC (7)+c CE (1)+c ED (12)=60+24+73=157.
Unilateral deviation from route (O-C-A-D) to route (O-B-D) does not pay off:
c OC (7)+c CA (7)+c AD (7)=60+0+84=144<c OB (12)+c BD (1)=84+68=152.
Unilateral deviation from route (O-C-A-D) to route (O-B-E-D) does not pay off:
c OC (7)+c CA (7)+c AD (7)=60+0+84=144<c OB (12)+c BE (12)+c ED (12)=84+0+73=157.
Similar computations hold for unilateral deviations from the second equilibrium route (O-B-E-D).
There is also a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, where each player chooses routes (O- 
C-A-D) and (O-B-E-D) with probabilities

Method
The experimental method was identical to the one used in Experiment 2 of RKDG. This was done in order to allow direct comparison between these two studies.
Subjects. The subjects were 54 undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Arizona, who volunteered to participate in a computer-controlled experiment on group decision making for payoff contingent on performance. Males and females participated in almost equal numbers.
None of the subjects had participated in Experiments 1 or 2. The subjects were divided into 3 groups (sessions) of 18 members each. A session lasted about 100 minutes. Excluding a $5
show-up bonus for participation, the mean payoff across sessions was $16.
Procedure. All three sessions were conducted at the Economic Science Laboratory, a large computerized laboratory with forty terminals located in separate cubicles. Upon arrival at the laboratory, each subject was asked to draw a marked chip from a bag that determined her seating.
Subjects were then handed written instructions (see Appendix) that they read at their own pace.
Questions about the procedure and the network game were answered individually by the experimenter.
Each session was divided into two separate parts, and specific instructions were handed to the subjects at the beginning of each part. The instructions for Part I displayed the traffic network in Game 3A and explained the procedure for choosing one of the three routes in this game. The instructions for Part II displayed the traffic network in Game 3B and explained the procedure for choosing one of the five routes in this game. --The route chosen by the subject.
--The number of subjects choosing each of the routes.
--The subject's payoff for the trial.
--The payoff associated with each possible route.
The instructions for Part II displayed the traffic network in Game 3B, explained the linear cost functions, and illustrated the computation of the travel cost for edges with either variable, fixed, or zero cost. Game 3B was also iterated 60 times. Because Game 3B, unlike Game 3A, allows for negative externalities, these were explained in detail and illustrated (see Appendix).
After Part II was completed, the subjects were paid their earnings in four randomly chosen trials from the sixty trials in Part I and four additional trials randomly drawn from the sixty trials completed in Part II. The eight payoff trials were drawn publicly at the end of the session. Points were accumulated across the eight payoff trials and then converted to money at the exchange rate of 25 points=$1.00. Subjects were paid their earnings individually and dismissed from the laboratory. Similarly to Experiment 2, we opted for a within-rather than between-subject design so that the same subjects would experience the effect of adding the two cost-free edges. This provides a strong test of the BP as it allows subjects who have repeatedly experienced Game 3A for 60 trials to resist choosing new routes in Game 3B that would result in lower payoffs. The same endowment of 184 points was given in both Games 3A and 3B. Under pure-strategy equilibrium play by all group members, this would have resulted in payoffs of 60 and 40 points per trial in Games 3A and 3B, respectively.
Results
To allow direct comparison with Experiment 2 of RKDG, this section is structured in the same way. We first test for session effects, then test for the implications of the BP on the aggregate level, and finally conclude the section with the study of switches and individual differences.
Session Effects: We computed the following eight statistics for each session: • The frequency of switches (out of 59) in Games 3A and 3B. (A switch occurs if a subject changes her route from trial t to t+1). Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of these statistics by session and game.
We conducted separate one-way ANOVA's on each of these statistics to test the null hypothesis of equality of means across the three sessions. None of these tests rejected the null hypothesis.
1
Having failed to find significant differences between sessions, the raw data were combined across the three sessions.
--Insert Table 1 percent of the trials compared to 0 percent under equilibrium play. Although equilibrium route choices are significantly higher than the non-equilibrium route choices in Game 3B, these mean frequencies (5.08 and 7.91 as compared to 7 and 11 for the two equilibrium routes) are well below the pure-strategy equilibrium frequencies. The ratios of the two observed mean frequencies (5.08/12.99=0.391, 7.91/12.99=0.609) are almost identical to the theoretical ratios (7/18=0.389, 11/18=0.611). This result suggests that the subjects who choose one of the two equilibrium routes in Game 3B on 74 percent of the trials, chose them in the predicted ratio. Of course, we would not expect all the subjects to switch to the new equilibrium routes in the augmented game on the first trial of Part II. But we would expect slow convergence to equilibrium with experience. Figures 3 and 4 display the mean number of subjects choosing each of the three routes in Game 3A and each of the five routes in Game 3B. To better exhibit the trends across trials, we display the running means in steps of 5 rather than the individual means for each trial. Consider first Fig. 3 . It is evident, and perhaps unexpected, that the mean route choices in Game 3A begin at levels very close to the corresponding pure-strategy equilibrium predictions in the first five trials. We discern no major learning trends across the 60 trials. One might expect-we certainly did--that once the subjects reach equilibrium in Game 3A no more switches would take place. This, however, was not the case. Out of a total of 180 trials across the three sessions in Game 3A, 8 ended up in a (4, 8, 6) split. However, there was only a single run of two consecutive (4, 8, 6 ) splits, and no run of three or more (4, 8, 6) splits. Purestrategy equilibria were seldom reached and once reached almost never maintained. Inspection of Fig. 4 shows that the subjects started choosing the two equilibrium routes on the early trials and that their frequency increased with experience. Mean choices for route (O-C-A-D) show roughly monotonic convergence to the equilibrium prediction, whereas the other equilibrium route choices show upward movement till trial 50 or so and decline thereafter. The three non-equilibrium routes were always chosen in positive proportions and display minor declining trends. Overall, the mean route choices of the two equilibrium routes in Game 3B did not converge to the equilibrium prediction in 60 trials, although they steadily moved in this direction. Examination of the learning curves seems to suggest that many more trials might have been needed for convergence.
Switches: Figure 5 displays the running mean number of switches for Games 3A and 3B. For both games, there is clear downtrend in the mean number of switches. The mean number of switches in Game 3A declines from about 9.5 on the first five trials or so to about 8 in the last trial. The corresponding values for Game 3B are 13 and 7.6. A player who adheres to mixed-strategy equilibrium play in Game 3A should switch her route from one trial to another with probability that depends on the route from which she is switching. This would result, on average, in 14 players switching their routes on any given trial. Our results show that subjects switched their routes in Game 3A but not as frequently as predicted by the mixed-strategy equilibrium play. Similarly for Game 3B, 10 players on average should switch from route (O-C-A-D) to route (O-B-E-D) or the other way around. Our results show that in the second half of Part II the subjects continued switching their routes in Game 3B but again not as frequently as predicted.
--Insert Fig. 5 about here --Is it beneficial to switch routes? The results suggest that switching does not pay off. For each subject separately, we counted the number of switches (min=0, max=59) in Game 3A and correlated it with her payoff in this game. We computed the same correlation between the number of switches and individual payoff in Game 3B. Both correlations were negative and significant: -0.57 for Game 3A and -0.65 for Game 3B, (p<0.01 in both cases).
Under mixed-strategy equilibrium play, the frequencies of switches in Games 3A and 3B are not correlated. To test this implication, we computed the correlation between the individual number of switches in Games 3A and 3B (n=54). The correlation was positive and quite high: r=0.71, p<0.01. We conclude from this statistic that the propensity to switch is unrestricted by the topology of the network. Subjects who switch more in one network are likely to switch more often in another.
How different are the switching patterns between players who chose the minimally congested route in a given trial and players who did not? To answer this question, we estimated two logit models by regressing the decision to switch for player i in trial (t+1) on a constant and a dummy variable that assumes a value equal to 1, if player i was in the least congested route in trial t, and 0, otherwise. The estimations yielded coefficients for marginal effects (computed at the sample means): +0.04 (p=0.07) for Game 3A and +0.09 (p=0.05) for Game 3B. This indicates that, on average, a player in both games shows higher propensity to switch, conditional on the fact that she chose the least congested route in the previous trial. These switching patterns suggest that, on average, subjects exhibit a forward looking approach in that a subject might wish to deviate from the least congested route on trial t to a different route on trial t+1 because of her expectation that more subjects would choose the least congested route on trial t+1. If this happens, she may avoid a possible reduction in payoff by switching to another route on trial t+1. However, this forward-looking "sophisticated" strategy did not pay off, as confirmed by our previous finding.
Individual Differences: In this section, we focus on individual differences in route choice and number of switches. Turning first to route choice, Table 2 shows that the three non-equilibrium routes in Game 3B were chosen together, on average, by 4.65 of the 18 subjects. However, Table   2 does not tell us whether all the subjects chose non-equilibrium routes in Game 3B and whether some subjects chose these routes considerably more often than others. Figure 6 answers this question by exhibiting the frequency distribution of the number of subjects choosing nonequilibrium routes in Game 3B. It shows that 3 subjects never chose non-equilibrium routes across all 60 trials, and a total of 20 subjects chose non-equilibrium routes in no more than 5 trials (mostly in the beginning of Part II). Most of the choices of non-equilibrium routes (16 or more) were contributed by 12 of the 54 subjects (22.2 percent). Thus, whatever conclusions we may draw with regard to the realization of the BP in the population may apply to a considerable number of individual players. We can only speculate about the reasons for the individual differences in Fig. 6 . They may indicate individual differences in the rate of recognizing the equilibrium routes in Game 3B and switching from the equilibrium routes in Game 3A to the new equilibrium routes in Game 3B. Under this interpretation, eventually all the subjects would be choosing equilibrium routes with more experience. Alternatively, they may indicate only partly successful signaling of more sophisticated subjects who, perceiving the payoff implications of equilibrium play in Game 3B (a 50 percent drop in earnings), persist in choosing non-equilibrium routes to prevent sizeable decline in their earnings.
--Insert Fig. 6 about here --Turning next to the individual differences in the frequency of switches, Fig. 7 displays the frequency distributions of individual number of switches for Games 3A and 3B, respectively.
Once again, in both the basic and augmented games we observe individual differences that cover almost the entire range from 0 to 59. We cannot tell whether the propensity to switch reflects boredom with the task, exploration, attempts to change the group behavior in order to exploit non-equilibrium play on subsequent trials, or some combination of these factors.
--Insert Fig. 7 about here --Comparison with Experiment 2 of RKDG. At the end of Section 3 we stated the hypothesis that support for the BP will decline as the anti-symmetric arrangement of the edge costs is replaced by an asymmetric cost structure. As argued earlier, the equilibrium solutions for Games 3A and 3B no longer yield equal proportions of players on the equilibrium routes as do the solutions for Games 2A and 2B, rendering coordination more difficult. Our results flatly reject this hypothesis.
In both the present experiment and Experiment 2 there were no session effects. In both experiments, the equilibrium solutions for the mean route choice frequencies in the basic game were fully supported, and the standard deviations associated with these means were accounted for quite well by the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution. Across all trials, non-equilibrium routes in Games 2A and 3A were chosen with roughly the same frequencies. By the end of the last trial, the two equilibrium routes in Game 3B were chosen jointly on 74 percent of the trials compared to 78 of the trials in Game 2B. In both experiments, the relative frequency of choosing either of the two equilibrium routes in the augmented game increased with experience. And in both studies, the mean number of switches in the basic and augmented games decreased with experience at roughly the same rate, and the frequency distributions of individual number of switches assumed a similar form. It would seem that the effects of the BP are more robust than we anticipated and may generalize to networks with a richer topology and more general cost structures than the ones investigated in the previous and present studies.
Conclusions and Discussion
The aim of this paper was to extend the experimental research on the Braess Paradox, and observe whether the occurrence of this paradox is limited to simple symmetric networks, or whether it is more robust and can be observed in more complex, asymmetric settings. While the network in this experiment is still rather simple as compared to real life traffic or communication networks, and more research is needed to address very complex networks, we believe that we can still conclude that the BP is rather robust.
The equilibrium solution accounts surprisingly well for the aggregate route frequencies in the basic game in the two previous studies by RKDG and the present study. Asymmetry in edge costs does not seem to affect this result. However, we find no support for pure-strategy equilibrium play on the individual level as fluctuations around the means do not seem to diminish with experience. Selten et al. (2004) , who studied route choice in a two-terminal traffic network similar to the network in Fig. 2a , also reported considerable fluctuations around the mean route frequencies over 200 trials. They proposed the multiplicity of the pure-strategy equilibria as one of the reasons for the non-convergence and persistence of fluctuations.
Additional analyses of individual strategies not reported here (see also RKDG) suggest a mixture of player types, some choosing the same route over all or most iterations, some mixing their routes but not necessarily in the proportions of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, and yet others deliberately upsetting coordination in an attempt to exploit deviations from equilibrium in subsequent trials.
Route choice frequencies in the augmented Game 3B move with experience in the direction of the Pareto deficient equilibrium. Convergence to the predicted (7, 11) split on the two equilibrium routes is not reached in 60 trials possibly because some subjects require more experience with the game to achieve equilibrium. However, learning does take place (Fig.4) , and the majority of the subjects do learn to avoid non-equilibrium routes after fewer than 10 trials (Fig. 6) . Our results seem to suggest that equilibrium may be approached, but most likely not reached, in real life traffic networks in which the number of drivers is neither fixed nor commonly known or information about the route choice frequencies for the entire population is not provided. This is a topic for further experimental investigation.
We view the study of the Braess Paradox as part of the more general experimental investigation of noncooperative games with Pareto deficient equilibria. Our results are consistent with the experimental results of the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game (n>2). When n=2, strategy choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma game do not converge to equilibrium even after hundreds of trials (e.g., Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) . But there is considerable evidence showing that when n>2, as in the present study, equilibrium is reached rather quickly over iterations of the game. 
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Introduction
Welcome to an experiment on route selection in traffic networks. During this experiment you will be asked to make a large number of decisions and so will the other participants. Your decisions, as well as the decisions of the other participants, will determine your monetary payoff according to the rules that will be explained shortly.
Please read carefully the instructions bellow. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to assist you.
Note that hereafter communication between the participants is prohibited. If the participants communicate with one another by any shape or form, the experiment will be terminated.
The Traffic Network Task
The experiment is fully computerized. You will make your decisions by clicking on the appropriate buttons. A total of 18 persons participate in this experiment (i.e., 17 subjects in addition to you). During the experiment, you will serve as drivers who are asked to choose a route to travel in two traffic networks that are described below. The two networks differ from one another. You will first receive the instructions for part 1 (the first network). After completing part 1, you will receive the new instructions for part 2. You will participate in 60 identical rounds in each part.
Description of Part 1
Consider the very simple traffic network exhibited in a diagram form on the next page. Each driver is required to choose one of three routes in order to travel from the starting point, denoted At the beginning of each round, you will receive an endowment of 184 points. Your payoff for each round will be determined by subtracting your travel cost for the round from your endowment. To continue the previous example, if your travel cost for the round is 88, your payoff will be 184-88=96 points. If your travel cost is 79, then your payoff for that round will be 184-79=105 points.
If too many drivers choose the same route, their travel cost may be negative. For example, if 10 drivers choose route [S-A-T], then their travel cost will be 76+(12×10)=76+120=196.
Therefore, their payoff for the round will be 184-196= -12.
At the end of each round you will be informed of the number of drivers who chose each route and of your payoff for that round. All 60 rounds in part 1 have exactly the same structure. -Your payoff for this round.
After completing all 60 rounds of part 1, you will receive a new set of instructions for part 2.
Payments. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for 4 rounds that will be randomly selected from the 60 rounds of part 1. The payment rounds will be selected publicly by drawing 4
cards from a pack of 60 cards. You will be paid in cash for your earnings in these 4 rounds according to a conversion rate of 25 points=$1.
In addition, you will receive a show up fee for $5 (for attending the experiment). This amount will be paid independently of the payments for the randomly selected rounds.
Please place the instructions on the table in front of you to indicate that you have completed reading them. Part 1 will begin shortly.
Part 2
Part 2 is identical to part 1 except for two segments that were added to the network: one from -Your payoff for that round.
-The payoffs for drivers choosing each of the five routes.
Payoffs will be determined exactly as in part 1 (4 payment rounds randomly drawn out of 60), paid according to an identical exchange rate: 25 points = $1. Therefore, across parts 1 and 2, you will be paid according to your earnings in 8 randomly chosen rounds.
Thank you for your participation.
